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Robert A. Friedlander* 
Aside from stating what the law is, or what the law is suppos-
ed to be, an important aspect of contemporary legal education is 
found in its emphasis upon precision, specificity, and definiteness; 
concepts that are sometimes difficult to grasp. In fact, much of 
Anglo-American law cannot be readily understood, nor properly 
implemented, without a working knowledge of legal definitions, 
for they set out the fundamental elements of our operative Anglo-
American legal system. A similar situation exists in international 
law. 
One must, however, be cautious at the outset since there is no 
legally recognized, or popularly accepted, definition of terror-
violence. The same holds true for self-determination, despite the 
more than 100 United Nations resolutions dealing with that 
controversial subject. Therefore, a great deal of confusion and 
misunderstanding has arisen over the past two decades as to ex-
actly what these terms of art truly represent. 
Terrorism is not only a political, psychological, and moral prob-
lem; it is first and foremost a legal problem. It is a legal problem 
because terrorist acts per se are considered criminal by all civiliz-
ed societies throughout the world. No organized legal system 
tolerates murder, serious bodily harm, severe mental distress, and 
kidnapping or false imprisonment. Yet, it is not necessary to seek 
to prohibit a still undefined act, if the elements comprising that 
act are themselves proscribed. If terrorism is essentially criminal, 
then it can be dealt with- by law- on that very level. 
Definitions which have been developed by academic experts 
in several disciplines are either too vague and overbroad, or too 
narrow and restrictive for possible statutory use, let alone public 
comprehension. For example, consider the following as a definition 
of international terrorism: 
Individual or collective ... conduct employing strategies of 
terror violence which contain an international element or are 
directed against an internationally protected target and whose 
aim is to produce a power-oriented outcome .... A power-
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oriented outcome is an outcome which is aimed at changing or 
preserving the political, social or economic structures or policies 
of a given state or territory by means of coercive strategies.1 
Although this statement is by a legalist, it would be difficult to 
identify the legal elements. It is more a definition of state power, 
particularly in a self-determinative conflict, although the lines are 
fuzzy and the language too open-ended. 
Not infrequently the political aspects of terror-violence take 
priority in definitional descriptions. For example, "the threat .or 
use of violence by private persons for political ends, where the 
conduct itself or its political objectives, or both, are international 
in scope."2· This explanation by two other legalists also fails to 
meet the myriad distinctions offered by terrorism's innumerable 
patterns and varieties. It does not tell us very much, for in the 
words of a best-selling modern novelist, "[t]error is a flexible 
trade."3 
N on-legalists do not seem to do any better in the definitional 
area. A contemporary political scientist offers this description: 
"[t]errorism can be defined as a strategy whereby violence is used 
to produce certain effects upon a group of people .... "4 (Yet this 
definition can also encompass a night mugging in Central Park). 
Many experts and commentators shy away from comprehensive 
generalizations and focus only upon the political aspect. For exam-
ple, one prominent security analyst stated that, "[p]olitical ter-
rorism can be defined as a strategy, a method by which an organiz-
ed group or party tries to get attention for its aims, or force con-
cessions toward its goals, through the systematic use of deliberate 
violence."5 The problem with this approach is that it focuses on 
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motive rather than on conduct, while motive in criminal law is 
largely irrelevant to the consequences of a criminal act. Such an 
approach also ignores non-systematic terror-violence. 
Terrorism, whatever else it may represent, is fundamentally 
an attack upon the prevailing legal order. The definition proposed 
by this Comment seeks to place the act itself, or what legalists 
refer to as conduct, within three basic typologies. "Terrorism is 
the use of force, or the threat of force, directed against innocent 
third parties for primarily ideological, financial or psychological 
purposes."6 The key to understanding the impact of the terrorist 
phenomenon is innocence, since the victim is not the ultimate 
target. There are two kinds of terrorism committed by two 
categories of victimizers. One is domestic and the other is inter-
national. International terrorism is any act of terror-violence con-
taining an int.ernational jurisdictional element. For example, the 
perpetrator may be from one state while the victim belongs to 
another state, or the terrorist act may occur in a jurisdiction 
foreign to both. International terrorism may or may not be on the 
rise at the beginning of the 1980's. So far, the numbers are 
unclear, but domestic terror-violence (particularly in Spain, Italy, 
Central America, and, until recently, Turkey) has been escalating 
at a dangerous pace. 
The term terrorism originated during the French Revolution 
of the eighteenth century and the Jacobin Reign of Terror. At 
first terrorism was identified with state action. Later it became 
applied to individual or group violence. Contemporary legal 
scholars and prevailing international legal standards divide ter-
rorism into two major components: individual or group terrorist 
activities, and state or governmental repression. The United 
States has been primarily concerned with the first category, as 
have the governments of Europe and Japan.7 The Third World na-
tions have emphasized the second category, particularly in the 
debates of the United Nations General Assembly's Ad Hoc Com-
mittee on International Terrorism.8 
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There is also a sub-classification, often applied erroneously by 
non-legalists. Transnational terrorism refers specifically (and sole-
ly) to non-state, non-political actors whom psychiatrist Frederick 
Hacker calls "criminals" and "crazies."9 With some variations, 
these people are the direct opposites of ideologically motivated of-
fenders. Furthermore, one type can interrelate with another, for 
political terrorism is also a manifestation of philosophical 
fanaticism. All violence is not terrorism, but all terrorism is 
violence, psychological as well as physical. 
Legally speaking, terrorism focuses upon the effect, while 
self-determination deals with causal relationships. While ter-
rorism is a human wrong, self-determination is, arguably, a human 
right. Yet both phenomena during the past quarter-century have 
become, to use a legal phrase, inextricably intertwined. 
There is more agreement among scholars and commentators 
on the definitional aspects of self-determination, though here too, 
there is no generally accepted definition and no consensus on the 
exact meaning of its various attributes. One prominent legal 
scholar has even divided self-determination into two major 
categories, socio-cultural and political. His definition of political 
self-determination stresses "the collective right of a people to pur-
sue their own political demands, to share power equally, and as 
the correlative right of the individual to participate freely and ful-
ly in the political process."10 
Another distinguished legalist, who similarly emphasizes the 
dual themes of human dignity and human rights, sees the essence 
of self-determination as "the freedom of participation in different 
value processes which is fundamentally at stake" in political, 
social or cultural disputes.11 Contrast this with the brief, explicit 
statement of the most prominent political scientist in the field, 
who defines self-determination as "the natural right of nations to 
determine their own statehood."12 The leading historian of the sub-
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ject also puts the major emphasis upon nationalism and nation-
hood maintaining that "the principle of self-determination is, in 
general terms, the belief that each nation has a right to constitute 
an independent state and determine its own government."13 
It should by now be evident that there are almost as many 
definitions and variations as there have been self-determination 
movements. Almost every expert and commentator warns of over-
generalization, admits to imprecision in terminology, and imposes 
qualifications on essential elements. There does appear to be basic 
agreement, however, on the role of self-determination in the post-
Charter14 world as a political program which stands for popular 
sovereignty on a global scale. The definition prop_osed here, admit-
tedly, does not cure all of these defects, but tries to take into ac-
count the historical fact that self-determination has more than 
mere political objectives. This author believes it can be called the 
"right" of a "people" to shape its own political, economic, and 
cultural destiny .15 Yet there are many questions still unresolved. 
What constitutes a people? What is meant by a nation? Is self-
determination an established right or merely a legally recognized 
remedy, qualified by the rights of secondary parties and the need 
to balance the overall equities in the context of the totality of the 
circumstances?16 Therefore, taking into account historical ex-
perience and inevitable political factors, this writer prefers the 
following as a more useful contemporary definition: "[s]elf-deter-
mination is a theoretical concept which implies the freedom of a 
dissident people to establish on its own initiative a viable independ-
ent national entity and whatever political and social structures it 
chooses for the preservation of that entity ."17 
The record of the past twenty years dramatically demon-
strates that asserted claims of right by dissident minority groups 
have sometimes ripened into national liberation movements which 
13. A. COBBAN, THE NATION STATE AND NATIONAL SELF-DETERMINATION 39 (rev. ed. 
1970). 
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employ frightening techniques of terror-violence to accomplish 
their proclaimed political goals. Thus, the unholy alliance of 
nationalism and terrorism has not only served to break down the 
delicate structure of world public order, but has also presented 
the international state system with a dangerous and potentially 
catastrophic choice- either the establishment of a global society 
based upon the rule of force, or the creation of a world community 
adhering to the rule of law. At issue is the survival of humankind. 
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